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Should We Subsidise Pre-School
Childcare, and If So, How?
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I. INTRODUCTION
The subsidy of childcare for pre-school-age children has moved rapidly up the
political agenda in the UK, and government policy has developed considerably
in this area. In his 1990 Budget, John Major introduced income tax relief for
childcare provided by the employer at the workplace. Since October 1994,
certain family credit claimants have been entitled to deduct up to £40 per week
of childcare expenditure from their income for the family credit means test,
2 and
from April 1997, all parents of four-year-olds will be eligible for an annual
£1,100 childcare voucher to be used as full or part payment for childcare
services.
3 The Labour Party has also long advocated increased state-funded
childcare in the form of nursery education for three- and four-year-olds. It
favours local education authorities (LEAs) setting targets for the provision of
nursery education and points to certain LEAs that already provide nursery
education for 90 per cent of three- and four-year- olds. The Liberal Democrats
have promised to increase public education expenditure by £2 billion (7 per
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2 The 1995 Budget raised this disregard to £60 per week.
3 The scheme has been piloted in four local education authorities — Kensington and Chelsea, Wandsworth,
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cent), with the first priority for this extra money being nursery education
services.
A fair summary of the political debate would be that the case for expanding
access to childcare for pre-school-age children has been accepted right across the
political spectrum but the mechanics of implementing increased support are
disputed. But it is only through examining why we might want to subsidise
childcare at all that we can begin to understand what sorts of policy might meet
our aims. In this article, we attempt to determine which sorts of childcare
subsidies are appropriate for different policy goals from both a theoretical and an
empirical perspective, and how far policy proposals meet these aims.
We begin, in Section II, by describing briefly the patterns of childcare use
amongst pre-school-age children in the UK, using a variety of survey evidence
and administrative statistics. This allows any policy discussion to be informed by
existing patterns of childcare use. In Section III, we examine the conceptual case
for childcare subsidies, focusing on potential market failures and distributional
outcomes in a free market for childcare so that we can define practical policy
objectives in any childcare strategy. This discussion is followed, in Section IV,
by an estimation of the costs and labour supply implications for women of
different childcare strategies. In Section V, we attempt to evaluate the
government’s childcare strategy in terms of the empirical evidence of the effects
of different childcare strategies and the policy criteria set out. We conclude in
Section VI.
II. THE USE OF PRE-SCHOOL CHILDCARE PLACES
There is no statutory duty to provide non-parental childcare for pre-school-age
children in the UK. Parents choose the forms of childcare that are most
appropriate for their children, ranging from solely parental care at home to a
substantial amount of out-of-home childcare provided by external childcare
sources. Naturally, these choices are constrained by many factors, including the
age and number of children, the employment status of parents, parental income
and what forms, cost and quality of childcare are available locally. These
constraints often leave many parents feeling their ability to choose is severely
limited, but even if all childcare services were free and widely available, we
would expect the childcare choices of parents of pre-school-age children to be
diverse.
In this section, we use the 1991-92 General Household Survey (GHS) to
present an outline of the childcare choices made by parents. For a more detailed
analysis of these data, see Duncan, Giles and Webb (1995) or OPCS (1993). The
survey provides a very rich source of data on childcare use as it includes a
special section for parents of pre-school-age children who were asked in detail
about their childcare use during daytime. From the 1991-92 GHS, we selected aSubsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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sample of 1,288 households that contained at least one dependent child under
five years of age.
1. Use of Childcare
In analysing the use of various forms of childcare, it is important to seek to
disaggregate childcare use into largely homogeneous groups. The GHS identifies
a number of forms of childcare which are listed below. Respondents were asked
for how many weeks a year and for how many hours each week they used each
arrangement. Some of the groups represented reasonably homogeneous services,
such as nursery schools, while others, such as childminding, are more diverse.
•   Parental care only: family did not record any childcare other than by the
parents.
•   Informal care: parents used other family members or friends on a voluntary
basis.
•   Nursery school: run either by a local authority or privately, on an educational
basis where a qualified teacher is present.
•   Local authority (LA) nursery: a crèche, nursery, playgroup or playscheme
provided by the local authority where no qualified teacher is present.
•   Playgroup: other crèche, playgroup or playscheme provided by a private or
voluntary body, where the parent may or may not be present during a session.
•   Childminder: either registered or unregistered, within or outside the home.
This category excludes babysitters and school-aged family and friends, but
includes post-school-aged family and friends provided they are paid for their
services.
•   Multiple care forms: more than one of the formal care forms above.
The choices made by parents in the survey are shown in Table 1. Among our
selected sample, 37 per cent of families used only parental care, while another 13
per cent supplemented parental care with other forms of free informal care
supplied by other family and friends. Half of the sample used some form of
formal care. Not all of this formal childcare involved charges, however, as 25 per
cent of formal care involved no fee. This leaves roughly 40 per cent of families
who paid for some childcare. Nursery schools (including reception classes at
primary schools for four-year-olds) were most likely to be free of charge and
were also the most-used type of formal care. The other main source of care used
was playgroups, which have tended to develop in areas with little other childcare
provision. Around 90 per cent of playgroup places involved some element of
cost or charge.
The use of different childcare forms is clearly also determined by factors
other than availability and cost. Figure 1 shows perhaps the most important
factor in determining the form of childcare used — the age of the children. For
simplicity, we have shown the childcare use by the age of the youngest child, soFiscal Studies
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TABLE 1
Childcare Use and Percentage Paid
Care form Percentage of Families Percentage paid
Informal
Parental care only 37 0
Informal care 13 0
Formal
Nursery school 18 52
LA nursery 5 64
Playgroup 13 91
Childminder 6 97
Multiple care forms 8 96
Total, informal care only 50 0
Total, formal care only 50 75
Total, all care forms 100 38
Source: 1991-92 GHS
FIGURE 1































Distribution of Hourly Childcare Cost by Childcare Type
aIn the figure, childcare costs have been capped at £4 per hour.
Source: 1991-92 GHS.
we have combined childcare use for that child and their pre-school-age brothers
and sisters (hence the use of nursery schools for children under one year old).
The sole use of informal care decreases with the age of the youngest child from
70 per cent of families with a youngest child below one year old to 24 per cent
amongst families with a four-year-old as their youngest child. As a corollary of
this, the use of nursery schools increases with the age of children, so that over 50
per cent of the four-year- olds in our sample had some nursery school provision.
4
The use of playgroups peaks at age three.
We have seen the proportion of different forms of childcare that involves
fees, but the distribution of these charges is also instructive. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of hourly charges for each childcare type. It highlights the diversity
of charges that parents face for childcare. While nursery schools and local
authority nurseries are either free at the point of use or have very low fees, other
forms of care, notably childminding and multiple forms of care, have a wide
diversity of charges and a much higher mean hourly cost. Playgroups generally
provide part-time care at a positive but low hourly charge.
                                                                                                                                   
4 This figure includes many of the children with multiple care forms. Research for January 1994 from the
Department for Education and Employment (1995) shows that 77 per cent of all four-year-olds were attending
nursery schools for at least part of the year prior to their first full primary school year. The discrepancy relates












































The number of hours of childcare used also differs across different childcare
types. On average, LA nurseries and playgroups provide 10 hours of childcare a
week, and nursery schools 20 hours. These contrast with childminding and
multiple care forms, which have much more diverse charges and weekly hours
averaging 30. This variety of charges and hours of childcare used helps us gain
an understanding of childcare costs faced by parents. It is clear from Figure 2
that the average hourly cost of childcare for many parents is low. But if they
wish to use childcare that enables full-time employment, charges are much
higher. Hence we see in the data that the average cost to parents of childcare
used is low but the marginal cost may be much higher and could act as a barrier
to employment.
2. Childcare Use and Women’s Employment
Figure 3 shows the mean weekly childcare hours, weekly childcare expenditure,
percentage of childcare paid and hourly childcare price by weekly hours of work
of mothers of under-fives in the 1991-92 GHS. It must be stressed that these are
averages, and just as the choice of childcare type for children of the same age is
diverse, so are all these elements of the purchase of childcare services. But there
are some important correlations at the mean between employment and childcare
use, the most obvious being that there is a positive correlation between the hours
of waged employment and weekly childcare hours and expenditure. But the
direction of causation cannot be determined from these correlations. Whether
employment necessitates childcare use, or the desire for formal childcare
necessitates waged employment to pay for it, is unclear. It is also apparent that
childcare is viewed by many families as having benefits that exceed those of
enabling the mother to take waged employment. Mothers not in paid
employment consume seven hours of childcare per week on average, and nearly
30 per cent pay for their childcare.
The final graph in Figure 3 shows the hourly price of childcare at different
hours of work. The low average hourly cost of childcare reflects a substantial
degree of subsidy for certain types of childcare, where parents often face
nominal charges only. This does not imply that the marginal cost of childcare is
equally low, as was shown in Figure 2. Indeed, the rising hourly cost of childcare
confirms the interpretation of Figure 2 that parents may have to switch to more
expensive forms of care, such as childminding, as their hours of work increase.
An alternative interpretation of the rising hourly cost is that it partly reflects a
greater ability to purchase more expensive and higher-quality childcare.
3. Other Factors Influencing Women’s Employment
We have so far concentrated on childcare use and its relationship to paid
employment. Rather than giving the impression that childcare is the only
important factor governing labour market outcomes for women, we show inSubsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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FIGURE 3
Weekly Hours, Expenditure, Percentage Paid and Hourly Price of Non-Parental
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FIGURE 4
Percentage of Mothers in Paid Employment by Marital Status and Employment
Status of Partner
Source: 1991-92 GHS.
Figures 4 and 5 two of the most important other factors that affect the female
participation decision. We show these graphs to highlight the complexity of
labour market participation decisions and the need to use econometric techniques
to try to disentangle the effects of different determinants of female labour force
participation.
Figure 4 shows that mothers of pre-school-age children in married or
cohabiting couples are much more likely to be in employment if their partner is
also in employment. This is often attributed in part to a consequence of the UK
means-tested benefit system which gives a much lower incentive for a woman to
take paid employment if her spouse is also unwaged,
5 although it also reflects the
fact that partners are likely to share many characteristics that affect employment
probabilities, not least living in the same place. The figure also shows the low
participation rates of lone parents, who also have high dependence on means-
tested benefits and are less likely to have someone else to share the childcare
responsibilities. Figure 5 shows the importance of the age of the youngest child
for participation. Around 10 per cent of mothers return full-time to waged
employment in the first year of their child’s life and this proportion remains
roughly constant as the age of the youngest child increases. Conversely, part-
time employment shows an upward trend with the age of the youngest child.
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FIGURE 5
Percentage of Mothers in Paid Employment by Abe of Youngest Child
Source: 1991-92 GHS.
III. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDISE CHILDCARE?
Before we can discuss the relative merits of different forms of childcare subsidy,
we have to ask whether any subsidy should be considered at all. After all, the
vast majority of children are desired by their parents, and the parents understand
that their joint income might well fall after having children. The decision to
bring up children can be considered as a choice like many others individuals
make, and the role of the state may simply be to ensure a minimum standard of
service from private childcare providers to protect children from undesirable
carers. If we wish to suggest that government should have a greater role, either
by providing or by subsidising childcare services, it must be shown either that
the childcare market fails or that the outcomes of the free childcare market have
distributional implications that society would prefer to avoid. And we must
remember that if valid arguments for childcare subsidies exist, this does not
imply a blank cheque. The costs of any subsidy must be balanced against
potential benefits.
The difference between market failure arguments and distributional concerns
is often blurred, but it is important to distinguish the motives behind any
arguments for subsidy. For example, it is often claimed that there is a market
failure argument for childcare subsidies to avoid the deterioration of women’s
labour-market- relevant human capital whilst they take a spell out of employment
to care for young children. Childcare subsidies would enable a faster return to
the labour market, and hence any skill loss of women after childbirth would be
mitigated. But this is a private decision for parents to make. If the financial





















of the loss of human capital is greater than non-parental childcare costs, the
family would arrange to pay for private childcare services to allow a more rapid
return to employment. Therefore the efficient solution would be to allow
families to choose the appropriate outcome. Society might wish to help enable
mothers return to the labour market if they so desire, but this is a distributional
concern regarding equality of opportunity for women and women’s independent
incomes, not a market failure issue.
1. Market Failures in Women’s Employment and Childcare Demand
There is a case for childcare subsidy on the basis of market failure in the labour
market for mothers and the childcare market. In both of these markets, the free
market might be improved on by correcting externalities, information or
preference failure, or imperfections in capital markets.
(a) Externalities
If we examine externalities first, we need to establish benefits to society from
subsidising childcare that exceed the private benefits to parents. In the labour
market, the continued participation of skilled women after childbirth may have
positive externalities that improve the performance of the economy as a whole.
An example would be subsidising the continued employment of skilled women
when there are bottlenecks, such as skill shortages, in the economy. But these
labour market externality arguments alone are relatively weak as they rely on
specific macro problems (or disequilibria) that would be mitigated by increased
women’s participation. The externalities are likely to be small, and certainly
almost impossible to measure. The `problem’ of skilled women taking time out
of the labour market could also be addressed by other government action, such as
retraining women wishing to re-enter waged employment. In addition, these
externality arguments apply almost exclusively to women with relatively high
skill levels, precisely the women who often earn enough to be able to exercise
choice on whether to re-enter employment without government subsidy. Lower-
skilled women will find it easier to re-enter the labour market in a job similar to
that in which they had previously been employed.
In the childcare market, it is much easier to make externality arguments for
childcare subsidy. Early childhood is an extremely important time for learning
and it is almost universally recognised that ‘attitudes and behaviour patterns
established during the first years of life are central to educational and social
development’ (Department of Education and Science, 1990). So, if
supplementary non-parental childcare provides children with a better start than
solely parental care, and this benefits society in addition to benefiting children,
there is a strong externality argument for promoting the greater use of childcare
for pre-school-age children.Subsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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Evidence on the effects of early childcare on the subsequent development of
children is fairly limited and often disputed. UK research results are mixed and
often suffer from very small sample sizes or have difficulty in controlling for the
social class of the children involved. For example, Osborn and Milbank (1987)
studied more than 13,000 children born in 1970 and compared the educational
and social outcomes of children who had gone to full day-care facilities (such as
local authority nurseries) with those of children who had gone to part-time
childcare or had stayed at home. They found that towards the end of primary
school, the day-care children had lower maths and reading scores and more
behavioural problems than the other children. This study was, however,
criticised because it could not control adequately for the social status of the
children attending day care in the UK, as most children attending LA day-care
facilities were from families judged to be `in need’. Howe (1990), in a smaller
study, compared 80 children from a variety of backgrounds, half going to
nurseries with high staff-child ratios and the other half going to lower-quality
nurseries. The children from the high-quality care had performed well on
educational and social assessments, while those from low- resourced nurseries
fared particularly poorly. In the US, Berrueta-Clement et al. (1984) studied 126
children from disadvantaged backgrounds, half of whom were enrolled in highly-
funded nursery schools while the rest stayed at home. At age 19, the group that
had attended nursery school were twice as likely to be in employment, 40 per
cent less likely to have been arrested and half as likely to have had teenage
pregnancies. These are examples of positive externalities found as a result of
childcare.
New American research has attempted to control for some of these analytical
problems. Currie and Thomas (1995) studied the US Head Start programme
which provides nursery education for over 600,000 disadvantaged American
children. Using large panel surveys of children, they compared the educational
and health outcomes of children who participated in Head Start or other non-
parental childcare with those of their siblings who received only parental care.
By exploiting within-family differences, they were therefore able to control for
social class. Whilst the raw academic performance of Head Start children was,
on some measures, 15 percentile points lower than that of those without
childcare, Head Start improved their performance by five percentile points
relative to their brothers and sisters who did not participate in the scheme. Currie
and Thomas concluded `Head Start closes over one-third of the gap between
children attending the program and their more advantaged peers’. This applied
both for whites and for African- Americans. The gains persisted throughout
school for white children but failed to do so for African-American children,
which the authors attributed mostly to inferior quality of subsequent schooling
that dissipated the benefits of the nursery education.
From this evidence, we believe that non-parental pre-school childcare can be
good for many children (although we accept that this is a contentious assertion,Fiscal Studies
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particularly for very young children) and if the benefits for children persist into
adult life, society would also benefit from the positive externalities associated
with more successful outcomes from the education system. Externality
arguments provide a certain rationale for childcare subsidy therefore, particularly
for children whose home environment was not providing adequate educational
and social development. But, similarly to the externality arguments in the labour
market, the externalities (rather than the private gains to the children themselves)
are particularly hard to measure and are perhaps relatively small.
(b) Information / Preference Failure
A second market failure argument for childcare subsidies could be that families
fail to gauge the financial losses of career breaks and / or fail systematically to
perceive the benefits of supplementary non-parental childcare. In the labour
market, if families underestimate the effect of being unwaged whilst children are
young on future income streams from employment and pensions, a potential
response from the government could be to subsidise childcare places to reduce
the initial costs of returning to the labour market. Alternatively, the government
might fund public information campaigns as a cheaper and more effective means
of changing individuals’ attitudes to reflect the true costs of spells out of the
labour market. In the childcare market, if the educational and social outcomes of
children attending certain forms of childcare are underestimated, there would
also be a case for subsidy, although a public information campaign might again
prove more cost- effective than childcare subsidies.
(c) Capital Market Imperfections
Even if there were no valid externality arguments and families acted on full
information, the cost of childcare services might, in the short term, be greater
than the immediate returns from employment. Families may have to borrow to
purchase private childcare services, in which case there needs to be a well-
functioning capital market, where loans can be arranged secured on the future
earnings potential of the woman. Credit providers have little means of verifying
this, so unless the loan were also secured on a tangible asset, it is unlikely that
credit would be forthcoming. Alternatively, a policy of government loans to
remove the capital constraints may prove more effective than childcare subsidies
in addressing these concerns.
Together, these externality, information and capital market failure arguments
provide some rationale on the basis of market failure for policies designed to
increase the labour participation of mothers of young children and demand for
childcare for pre-school-age children above the free market level. Indeed, theSubsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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decisions to demand childcare and to supply labour have joint elements,
6 so if
there is insufficient demand for childcare, fewer women would supply labour
which would compound the labour market failures, and vice versa.
But most of the market failure arguments are relatively small, are probably
already covered by current subsidised childcare arrangements and could also be
addressed by policies other than childcare subsidies. It is not that parents or
society fail to recognise the benefits of increased use of pre-school childcare and
education for children, but that they cannot afford it. This is not a market failure
but a distributional concern, and it is to these rationales for government subsidy
that we now turn.
2. Distributional Issues in Childcare Use
There are many distributional issues that might concern us regarding access to
childcare and employment. Returning to the effects of childcare on children:
regardless of market failure, if we consider that some pre-school education is
good for the development of children, we would be very concerned about
equality of opportunity in society if children in poorer families were unable to
benefit from it. Richer families would be able to buy their children a head start
which would persist throughout life. On distributional grounds, we might want
all children to be able to benefit from nursery education from the age at which
the educational and social benefits become great. It is easy to make a strong case
that it is better to direct resources at younger children to give an equal start in
life than to fund older children once patterns of behaviour have been established.
If resources are more limited, distributional concerns would lead us to prioritise
children from more disadvantaged and poorer backgrounds for access to
childcare services to help give them an educational start more similar to that of
advantaged children.
Though the market failure argument for helping women back into the labour
market might not be seen as entirely convincing, there are potential distributional
concerns that might suggest a similar policy strategy. Childcare subsidies that
encouraged a return to the labour market would minimise the potentially
damaging financial consequences of a spell out of the labour market for those
with childcare responsibilities relative to those without. These distributional
concerns are strengthened by the fact that, in the vast majority of couples, it is
the woman who has the role of principal carer. As a result, a woman typically
experiences human capital loss while a couple’s children are young and this
perpetuates women’s subordinate economic status in the family and in society in
terms of future employment possibilities and pensions. Subsidised childcare
might enable women who want to return to the labour market to do so, and
thereby provide them with an income dependent on neither the state nor a
                                                                                                                                   
6 See Duncan and Giles (1994).Fiscal Studies
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spouse. This distributional concern suggests childcare subsidies at an earlier age
to minimise employment gaps for women. This argument does not suggest that
women should be forced to return to waged employment but that childcare
subsidies (or other policies) improving the desirability of the option to do so
could substantially improve women’s relative economic status.
IV. THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT CHILDCARE SUBSIDIES
In the previous section, we discussed whether to subsidise childcare and
concluded that there were a number of reasons to do so, with the strongest
arguments being based upon distributional concerns. In this section, we attempt
to assess the effects of different approaches to subsidising childcare. The
estimates shown here are based on our econometric models of the labour supply
and childcare demand of mothers of pre-school-age children, and a more detailed
description of the techniques involved and the detailed results can be found in
Duncan, Giles and Webb (1995).
Estimating the potential labour supply response to a childcare reform is very
important in evaluating different childcare policies. It is clearly relevant for
estimates of increased women’s participation in the labour market, but is also
important in determining costs and distributional effects. Increased women’s
labour supply could potentially reduce the exchequer costs of a scheme through
lower social security expenditure and higher income tax and National Insurance
revenue. Distributional effects will also be changed if women alter the number of
hours a week they work. Our estimates attempt to capture these effects.
It must be stressed that estimates of labour supply are not simply a question
of trying to calculate how many women would seek employment as a result of a
particular childcare subsidy.
7 The incentive effects of childcare subsidies are
much more varied, depending on the appropriate types of childcare for each
family, the labour market participation of a woman’s partner, other taxes and
benefits and each individual’s preferences. The direction of labour supply
response is not even clear. Childcare subsidies increase the financial return to
each hour of paid employment, thereby improving the incentive for individuals
to increase paid employment (the substitution effect), but they also reduce the
number of hours of paid employment necessary to achieve a given material
standard of living or the number of hours of childcare (the income effect). Hence
estimating the incentive effects of childcare subsidies is complex, and the results
shown reflect our best estimates of the factors that affect the labour supply
decision, given the data and the statistical techniques we used.
                                                                                                                                   
7 Although studies along these lines, for example Holtermann and Clarke (1992) or Bradshaw et al. (1996), can
be useful for cross-country comparisons and give immediate and accessible estimates of the effects of different
subsidy regimes.Subsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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We simulated four broad methods of subsidising childcare using two
microsimulation models — TAXBEN and SPAIN — based on the 1992 Family
Expenditure Survey (FES), a representative sample of the UK population.
TAXBEN is a tax and benefit model which calculated the immediate effect on
families’ incomes of different childcare subsidies, given the childcare they used.
It also calculated the amount of childcare that would be used if mothers of pre-
school- age children worked more or fewer hours. As the FES does not contain
childcare questions as detailed as those in the GHS shown in Section II, we
estimated the probability of use of childcare, the type of childcare used and the
weekly expenditure on that care using an econometric model derived from GHS
data. We were therefore able to produce a profile of childcare costs and
probabilities of using childcare for each mother in the FES at all possible hours
of employment. The model was sufficiently flexible to allow switching of type of
childcare as hours of work increased, which would give major discontinuities in
the cost of childcare at different hours levels. This mimics well the choices faced
by parents. Finally, we treated our estimated childcare expenditures as a cost that
the family would have to pay and calculated budget constraints on the basis of
post-childcare income. These budget constraints show the combinations of hours
of work and net income after childcare costs available to mothers of pre-school-
age children. An example of the sort of budget constraint generated for one of
the mothers in our sample is shown in Figure 6, where the dashed line shows that
if childcare costs are included, at some points this mother would be worse off if
she worked more hours (particularly where our estimate showed a switch to
multiple types of childcare used), and that taking account of the effect of
childcare costs on the financial returns to work is very complicated.
FIGURE 6
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Using estimates of childcare use at different hours levels, we simulated the
effects of introducing different forms of additional childcare subsidy. TAXBEN
provided distributional results for each reform and an initial costing. But the
reforms also altered the budget constraints for the mothers in our FES sample.
For example, the solid line in Figure 6 indicates the budget constraint with
universal subsidy of all childcare costs. The changes in budget constraints from
different reforms were entered into SPAIN, our labour supply simulation model.
SPAIN simulated desired changes in hours of employment using a structural
labour supply model
8 for the mothers of pre-school-age children on the basis of
the changed budget constraint from the reform. Where we simulated a change in
desired hours, the results were fed back into TAXBEN to derive revised
costings, distributional results and use of childcare. In our simulations, we
assumed elastic supply of childcare if parents were modelled to change their
demand. If supply were less elastic than we assumed, then some of the
favourable effects we consider may be offset by increases in the price of
childcare. In the long run, many of the subsidies we examined would have a
bigger effect on the childcare market, which might have an additional effect on
labour supply and childcare demand, but these effects could not be included. Our
results should be viewed, therefore, as the effects of increased childcare
subsidies on the childcare market as it was in 1991-92, and not as accurate
predictions of the future.
We simulated the following policies:
•   Childcare disregards in family credit. This reform was implemented in
October 1994 to allow recipients of family credit, housing benefit and council
tax benefit to deduct up to £40 childcare expenditure a week from their
income before it was means-tested. Hence, if families were spending £40 on
childcare a week, their income for family credit and other in-work benefits
would appear to be lower, and they would therefore receive more from these
benefits. If they already received maximum family credit, their benefit would
not increase, however.
•   Childcare allowances / vouchers. This broad policy area encompasses three
separate policy reforms. First was a £10 a week allowance paid in respect of
each child under five years old in a family. These allowances would be paid
regardless of whether childcare was bought with the money. The second
reform was a £10 a week voucher given to a family for each under-five-year-
old child. This voucher would only be redeemed against paid childcare, so
families with no need for paid childcare would not benefit. The third version
of this reform limits the voucher only to those families where all potential
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carers were working more than 16 hours a week, to increase childcare
subsidies for those in work but not for unwaged individuals.
•   Full subsidy of all childcare costs. This group of reforms effectively reduces
the cost of childcare to zero for all forms of childcare. Variants of this reform
restricted the subsidy policy only to children of nursery-school age (three-
and four-year-olds) and only to those families with fairly low net incomes.
We chose a very simple means test. Full subsidy would be reduced for
families with net earnings above £200 a week at a rate of 30p for each £1 of
net income above this level. The means test was deliberately simple and not
linked to the existing benefit system so that it would be feasible for childcare
institutions to operate it. In all, four variants of this reform were modelled.
•   Tax-relieving childcare. In this reform, each family was allowed to offset up
to £50 a week childcare costs against income tax. The relief was restricted to
the lower rate (20 per cent) band to avoid richer families gaining more from a
given childcare expenditure. To encourage tax relief only for families who
have no access to informal care, the relief was only available if both partners
in a couple were taxpayers. In these circumstances, the relief is given to the
woman.
In general, we found that childcare subsidies have predominantly positive
effects on labour supply, particularly where the subsidy is available to mothers
of very young children (that is, under three years old). Such women typically
face some of the largest barriers to employment, have the lowest current access
to subsidised childcare and are less likely to have already returned to waged
employment. Another clear conclusion was that the beneficial labour supply
effects of a reform were not necessarily in direct proportion to the total amount
of public subsidy involved. A summary of the key results for each of the reforms
is given in Table 2.
The results show that, with the exception of the childcare disregard, childcare
reforms are extremely unlikely to `pay for themselves’ through increased tax
revenues and reduced benefit cost. This result will disappoint many
policymakers, especially those who expect childcare reforms to be a costless
means of transforming the labour market and a policy reform where everyone
gains and nobody loses. The problem with arguments that childcare subsidies
pay for themselves is that there are two important sources of dead-weight loss
for almost any practical childcare subsidy.
9 First, childcare subsidies almost
always also subsidise families where the mothers would return to waged
employment anyway; and second, mothers who would not return to waged
employment can also use the increased subsidised childcare provision. For all
reforms, we also estimated that a small number of mothers would reduce their
                                                                                                                                   
9 See Duncan, Giles and Webb (1994) for a more detailed account of whether policies designed to increase
labour supply pay for themselves.Fiscal Studies
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hours as they no longer had to work so many hours to achieve their desired
standard of living. For these women, the government loses National Insurance
and income tax revenue on top of the additional subsidy costs.
TABLE 2

















£20m 10,000 20,000 5,000 —
2a £10 allowance £1,600m — 20,000 14,000 £1,600m




£200m 30,000 10,000 — £170m
3a Universal
subsidy
£1,000m 70,000 130,000 — £900m
3b Means-tested
3a




£400m 20,000 80,000 — £400m
3d Means-tested
3c
£100m 16,000 — — £70m
4 Tax relief up to
£50 a week
£160m 10,000 15,000 — £160m
Note: — denotes an insignificant number.
In our results, we show that the childcare disregard did have roughly zero
final exchequer cost, but the way this reform managed to pay for itself was by
restricting its impact so tightly that only a tiny proportion of the roughly three
million mothers of the under-fives could gain. At the other end of the scale,
broad-brush subsidies to the mothers of young children, such as unconditional
allowances, can be very expensive and bring relatively little additional benefit in
terms of increased labour supply. This is because they provide income regardless
of childcare need at a particular hours level, and hence give a pure income
transfer to mothers that has negative labour supply effects. The policy with the
greatest labour supply effect is scheme 3a in Table 2, where the full cost of
childcare payments is subsidised. The cost shown of nearly £1 billion might
seem low, but remember that this cost only relates to the cost of subsidising the
existing childcare market. If, as we would expect, this grew substantially, the
cost of full subsidy would be many times greater.Subsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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Therefore the aim of the other reforms was to benefit large numbers of
mothers of young children whilst containing overall costs. In most cases, this
objective required some method of limiting access to subsidy. One approach to
restricting access is to means-test the subsidy. It is possible to obtain significant
cost savings even with our generous means-testing regime that only reduced
subsidy from families with take-home pay of £200 a week or greater. In the case
of universal direct subsidy, the use of a means test of this sort cut the exchequer
cost by around three-quarters whilst preserving many of the positive effects on
work incentives. This is because means-testing directs childcare subsidies to
those unlikely already to be in the labour market and to the less well off, both of
which have desirable consequences in terms of our policy objectives. But it is
likely that in the longer term, the savings from this form of means-testing relative
to universal subsidy would be less dramatic than shown in Table 2 because an
increase in demand for subsidised formal care by poorer families would occur
regardless of whether their economic status changed. We could not include this
feature in our estimates, but it would also make the eventual costs of schemes 3b
and 3d many times higher than shown but still considerably lower than universal
subsidy.
An alternative (or complementary) approach is to limit subsidy to children of
a particular age, as in schemes 3c and 3d. Given that almost half of the mothers
of children of this age are already in the labour market, a restriction of this sort
reduces the scope for using childcare subsidy to enhance the incentives to take
waged employment, so the financial flowback to the Treasury from positive
labour supply responses is smaller. The merits of this type of targeting cannot
therefore be based on labour supply responses.
A third way of limiting costs is to restrict subsidy only to those in work.
Effectively, this is shown in reforms 1, 2c and 4 — the childcare disregard,
vouchers for working parents and tax relief. This form of restriction has the
advantage of maximising any labour supply effects of subsidy, since no help is
received by those who remain outside the labour market. This type of restriction
should be favoured if the primary aim is to increase women’s labour supply.
Distributionally, this approach is less attractive though, since those in
employment are, in general, better off than the unwaged. This is particularly true
for the tax-relieving option, where those with the greatest gains were
predominantly two-earner couples already in employment and consuming
childcare.
From our simulations, we can conclude that, in nearly all circumstances, the
cost of childcare will be positive and that, in the longer term, broad-brush
subsidies can be very expensive. Labour supply response is generally positive,
and maximised if subsidy is limited only to those in employment and if financial
means- testing targets help at poorer families without losing too much of the
positive incentive effect. Having examined the effects of a number of different
strategies for subsidising childcare, we now compare the government’s childcareFiscal Studies
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policies with our objectives set out in Section III and the results of our
simulations in this section.
V. GOVERNMENT CHILDCARE POLICIES
Government policy is basically following a two-pronged strategy: first,
increasing support within the in-work benefit system to encourage labour supply
and, second, providing childcare vouchers for four-year-olds to increase the level
of childcare provision. How far do its policies achieve these objectives?
The £40 a week disregard of childcare expenditure in family credit and other
in-work means-tested benefits has been carefully designed. Only lone parents
and couples where both partners are waged and at least one parent works more
than 16 hours a week receive the disregard. As such, it very effectively targets a
small group of parents on low incomes who face potentially serious barriers to
employment from childcare costs. Our estimates shown in the previous section
for the exchequer cost are around zero after labour supply response, which
implies it was sensible for the government to increase the value of the disregard
to £60 in the 1995 Budget. But because this policy is so restrictive and the
targeting so effective, it does not improve overall women’s labour supply
greatly. However, for the families receiving the additional help through the
family credit system, this will constitute a significant increase in their standard
of living and the policy can therefore be welcomed on these grounds alone.
The childcare vouchers to be introduced nationwide in April 1997 are a very
different animal and show that the primary aim of the government’s childcare
subsidies is not simply to increase women’s participation in the labour market.
Each parent of a four-year-old will be given a £1,100 nursery education voucher
which will be exchangeable for a place in the state, voluntary or private sector in
participating institutions. Parents currently using the private or voluntary sector
and paying charges for their childcare services will receive subsidy up to the full
£1,100 value of the voucher, provided the childcare service provider has been
validated for inclusion in the voucher scheme. The Department for Education
and Employment’s aim is that the vouchers will cover at least five sessions (each
around 2½ hours) of nursery education a week, which is the amount assumed by
the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority for desirable outcomes for
learning.
There will be no user charges in the state sector. If places exist, the voucher
should cover a part-time place in a nursery school and up to a full-time place in a
reception class. But previous grant subsidy to these state institutions will be
clawed back pound for pound up to the value of the voucher, so they will be no
better off if their pupil numbers remain unchanged. Parents with children in the
state sector will also be no better off. In future, they will have to exchange the
voucher for services they previously received free of charge.Subsidising Pre-School Chilcare
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Other parties will certainly gain. Assuming that, in the very short term, the
supply of childcare places is fixed and the price of childcare places does not rise,
then the value of the vouchers will represent windfall gains to the parents
currently paying for private childcare services. Figure 7 shows 1994-95 FES data
on household expenditure on childcare services by income quintile for those
families with a four-year-old. The expenditure has been capped at £1,100 for
each family to represent the gain from the voucher scheme assuming the price of
childcare remains unchanged. It is immediately apparent that, in the short term,
well-off families benefit from the largest gains, and hence the voucher scheme
has precisely the opposite distributional consequences to those that would
address the distributional concerns outlined above.
What will be the effect on labour supply in the short term? We cannot expect
significant increases in women’s labour supply because the parents who will
gain initially are more likely to be already in employment, and those using state
nursery places will be unaffected. There will be some negative labour supply
incentives created, as the current users of private- or voluntary-sector places will
receive a pure windfall cash gain. Therefore most of the additional government
expenditure on vouchers (some £165 million) is entirely dead-weight loss. It will
have no effect on parents using state-sector childcare, but simply provide
additional income for already well-off families.
Alternatively, in the short term, private childcare institutions may try to
appropriate the rents from the vouchers by capitalising the voucher value into the
price of private childcare services for four-year-olds. In this scenario, the price of
private childcare services would rise, and excess profits would be made until
new private suppliers entered the market. If the value of vouchers is capitalised
into prices, there will be no windfall gains to parents and consequently no effect
on labour supply because parents will be unaffected in real terms.
FIGURE 7
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What about the longer term? The longer-term effects depend entirely on the
responsiveness of childcare supply to the vouchers. We would envisage that the
economic rent made in the short term by childcare providers would increase
childcare supply and would reduce the price of private childcare services
towards current prices. This would increase the provision of childcare places for
four-year- olds and improve the options available to parents, which would satisfy
to an extent the government’s desire for greater provision of childcare services,
particularly for the few families whose four-year-olds receive no nursery
education. But, however generously the scheme is viewed, these favourable
outcomes are only achieved with large dead-weight cost from subsidising
affluent families who already consume private childcare services for whom the
case for subsidy is the weakest. The additional exchequer expenditure on the
voucher scheme is therefore poorly targeted. Means-testing vouchers or
increasing the number of state-provided nursery school places would be the most
obvious ways of modifying the policy to satisfy the concern to see an expansion
of childcare provision for four-year-olds and to have a low exchequer cost.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The case for greater childcare subsidy efficiency is now widely accepted. But it
seems that sometimes the fundamental reasons for childcare subsidies become
lost in actual policy formation. Policies, such as the government’s voucher
scheme, are devised that channel the additional funds towards families for whom
the arguments for subsidy are weakest.
We believe that a serious case can be made for increased subsidy for
childcare, particularly on distributional grounds. This could take the form of
universal provision for pre-school-age children in the long run, but if the
significant cost of universal provision cannot be justified, explicit forms of
targeting subsidy can be implemented. Of the forms of targeting, we suggest,
along with the government and opposition parties, that nursery education for all
children near school age deserves a high priority. In addition, though, we believe
the greatest gains arising out of distributional concerns would come from
improving access to childcare facilities for lower-income families, who currently
cannot afford childcare services, who face the greatest barriers to employment
and whose children have tended to perform relatively poorly at school.
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